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SPECIAL FEATURE
LESSONS FROM RELOCATIONS PAST: CLIMATE
CHANGE, TRIBES, AND THE NEED FOR PRAGMATISM
IN COMMUNITY RELOCATION PLANNING
Eli Keene*
Introduction
The first American communities that will be forced to adapt to the new
era of rapid global climatic change are some of the continent’s oldest. Up
and down the coasts of the mainland United States and Alaska, American
Indian and Alaska Native tribes are already confronting accelerating
erosion and increased coastal flooding. Scientists generally project that sea
levels will rise an average of one to four feet by 2100, the upper bound of
which would permanently inundate large swaths of U.S. coastal cities such
as New Orleans and Miami.1 But for many coastal tribes, this future is
already a reality. Faced with the possibility that their lands and homes are
one storm away from being washed out to sea, a number of American
Indian communities are already deciding where they will go once their land
is no longer inhabitable.

* Associate at Clifford Chance, Washington, D.C. J.D., 2017, Columbia Law School;
B.A., 2011, Columbia College, Columbia University. This paper was based on research
connected to the author’s work as a research associate for America's Eroding Edges, a
National Geographic-funded project on climate change and cultural heritage in the United
States.
First-place winner, 2016-2017 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. John Walsh et al., Chapter 2: Our Changing Climate, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 66 (Jerry M. Melillo,
Terese (T.C.) Richmond & Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014) [hereinafter 3RD NAT’L ASSESSMENT]
(providing a medium confidence assessment that “global sea level rise will be in the range of
1 to 4 feet by 2100”); Sea Level Rise and Coastal Flooding Impacts, NAT'L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://coast.noaa.gov/slr (last visited Dec. 24, 2016) (providing
detailed maps of projected sea level rise across the United States). In early 2017, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) revised its sea level rise projections to
reflect new models of Antarctic ice sheet collapse. The Agency’s revised “extreme” scenario
shows global mean sea levels rising by up to 8.2 feet by 2100. See WILLIAM V. SWEET ET AL.,
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL RISE
SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES vi (2017); see also Robert M. DeConto & David Pollard,
Contribution of Antarctica to Past and Future Sea-Level Rise, 531 NATURE 591 (2016).
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The question of where and how to assist Indian communities when
coastal armoring measures prove unfeasible presents a number of options.
One such option is to do nothing, allowing communities to disperse as
flooding and erosion threaten individual homes and communal
infrastructure. Alternatively, a community could be “collocated,” meaning
it would be wholesale integrated into an existing urban or suburban area.
Finally, communities could be voluntary relocated as a whole, transplanting
the entire population to a new site located on safer ground.
The preferred option for many tribal communities is voluntary
community relocation. As of 2016, at least ten Indian communities across
the United States are seriously considering wholesale community relocation
as a means of adaptation to climate change.2 Nevertheless, there are a
number of obstacles to successfully relocating communities, not least of
which is the prohibitive cost of doing so. As a result, state and federal
agencies have made little progress on making community relocation a
reality.3 With little movement on formulating a national framework for
relocation of climate-displaced tribal communities, it is increasingly likely
that these communities will face either makeshift collocation or complete
dispersal when they are evacuated due to an extreme weather event.4
2. These communities are: Kivalina, AK; Newtok, AK; Shaktoolik, AK; Shishmaref,
AK; Isle de Jean Charles, LA; the Hoh Indian Reservation (WA); the village of La Push on
the Quileute Reservation (WA); the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Reservation (WA); the village of
Tahola on the Quinault Indian Reservation (WA); and the community of Tulalip Bay on the
Tulalip Indian Reservation (WA). Native communities in Hawai’i and U.S. territories in the
Pacific are also considering relocation, but fall outside the scope of this paper. See T.M. Bull
Bennett et al., Chapter 12: Indigenous Peoples, Land and Resources, in 3RD NAT’L
ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 297-317; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ALASKA
NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING VILLAGES
THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, 20 (2009) [hereinafter GAO 2009]. A number of
Native villages in Alaska are also pursuing partial relocation efforts, moving individual
homes and communal buildings to higher ground within the existing village. There is no
comprehensive list of communities engaged in gradual relocation, but they include the
Alaska Native villages of Allakaket, Golovin, Hughes, Huslia, Koyukuk, Nulato, Teller, and
Unalakleet.
3. GAO 2009, supra note 2; Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations:
Creating an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (2011).
4. In December 2016, reports quietly surfaced that the Obama Administration had
convened an interagency taskforce to begin to develop such a framework. At the time of
writing, it remains unclear whether this task force will survive the next presidential
administration. See Christopher Flavelle, Obama’s Final Push to Adapt to Climate Change,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-16/obamas-final-push-to-adapt-to-climate-change.
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This Article places the options for government action on climate-induced
relocation into the context of the Indian and Alaska Native relocation
efforts of the Termination Era of the 1950s. These relocation programs hold
important lessons for formulating policies on relocation today. Most
importantly, moving communities comes with high social and economic
costs that extend beyond replacing physical infrastructure. These costs must
be addressed not only in concluding that community relocation is the bestcase scenario for affected tribes, but also for addressing the needs of these
communities if relocation cannot ultimately be funded.
Part I of this Article presents three short case studies of Indian and
Alaska Native communities that are seeking to relocate away from the
coast. Part II introduces the advantages and disadvantages of community
relocation and collocation, and examines the likely outcomes if no action is
taken. Part III places the options for tribal coastal retreat in the context of
two 1950s relocation events—the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) urban
relocation program and the resettlement of the Alaska Native population of
King Island to Nome in the 1960s. Finally, Part IV argues that current
discussions of relocating climate-threatened Indian and Alaska Native
communities do not integrate lessons learned from past relocation efforts
and are therefore likely to produce similarly negative results.
I. Tribes and Coastal Retreat
American Indian communities on the coastlines experience the effects of
climate change in different ways. While the primary concerns are the same
across the United States—accelerated coastal erosion and sea level rise—
the legal backgrounds from which American Indian communities approach
these concerns vary significantly. These varying legal statuses mean that
affected communities have used different forms of leverage with varying
degrees of success in attempting to procure funding for relocation and
adaptation planning. This Part provides a cross-section of these experiences
by briefly introducing three different communities seeking to relocate away
from the coast. These case studies introduce the common challenges faced
by tribes seeking to relocate, including the problem of obtaining the funds
to do so.
A. Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana
Isle de Jean Charles is a narrow island approximately eighty miles
southwest of New Orleans. It is connected to the surrounding Bayou by a
single, narrow, un-elevated road. The island has lost about ninety-eight
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percent of its total landmass since 1955,5 a result of upriver levee
construction, wetland degradation, and a gradual rise in sea level.6 Any
notion that the remaining sliver of land could be saved was abandoned in
2002, when the Army Corps of Engineers concluded that extending an
ongoing levee project to protect Isle de Jean Charles was cost prohibitive. 7
Permanent relocation of the island’s residents was first proposed by the
Army Corps of Engineers in its 2002 assessment of the levee project.8 In
2016, the State of Louisiana received a $92.6 million resilience grant from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), $48 million of
which was allocated to relocate the Isle de Jean Charles community to safer
ground.9
Isle de Jean Charles is thought to have been initially settled sometime in
the 1800s by intermarried French and American Indian families.10 While
the island’s population grew, at one point, to some 300 people, the damage
done by strong hurricanes—in particular, Hurricane Katrina, in 2005—has
dispersed most residents and the current population has dwindled to about
sixty.11 Most of the residents are members of the Biloxi-ChitimachaChoctaw tribe, though the United Houma Nation also claims several of the

5. STATE OF LA., NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE COMPETITION: PHASE II APPLICATION
105 (2015), http://www.doa.la.gov/ocddru/ndrc/ndrc_pii_final_eximg.pdf [hereinafter NDR
APPLICATION].
6. Louisiana Coastal Wetlands: A Resource at Risk, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERV.,
https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/la-wetlands/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2016); Ricardo A. Olea & James
L. Coleman, Jr., A Synoptic Examination of Causes of Land Loss in Southern Louisiana as
Related to the Exploitation of Subsurface Geologic Resources, 30 J. COASTAL RES. 1025
(2014).
7. Marisa Katz, Comment, Staying Afloat: How Federal Recognition as a Native
American Tribe Will Save the Residents of Isle De Jean Charles, Louisiana, 4 LOY. J. PUB.
INT. L. 1 (2003).
8. Rick Bragg, As the Sea Swallows, the Islanders Hang On, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/30/us/as-the-sea-swallows-the-islanders-hangon.html.
9. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Award $1 Billion Through
National Disaster Resilience Competition (Jan. 21, 2016), https://archives.hud.gov/news/
2016/pr16-006.cfm.
10. Bienvenue, Aiokpanchi, Welcome to Isle de Jean Charles, ISLE DE JEAN CHARLES,
http://www.isledejeancharles.com/island (last visited Dec. 24, 2016).
11. Carolyn Van Houten, The First Official Climate Refugees in the U.S. Race Against
Time, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 25, 2016), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/
160525-isle-de-jean-charles-louisiana-sinking-climate-change-refugees/.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss1/7

No. 1]

SPECIAL FEATURE

263

island’s remaining families.12 While both of these tribes are recognized by
the State of Louisiana, neither has ever received federal recognition.13 Land
on the island has been held in fee since the State opened it for sale in 1876,
and is not legally considered Indian Country.14 This means that the
community is not eligible for special treatment afforded to federally
recognized tribes, such as the ability to put lands into trust, the ability to
apply to certain grants as a tribe, and the general benefit of the federal trust
responsibility.15
Members of the community have advocated for relocation both as a way
to preserve traditional practices and bring back those that have already been
lost. The community’s new site design, for example, includes ceremonial
space for pow wows, which the Tribe has not held since Hurricane Katrina
hit in 2005.16 The community has lost significant aspects of its traditional
subsistence lifestyle, in part because almost all the land available for
agriculture has been washed away.17 The new site plan will also include
large swaths of agricultural land in an attempt to support the growing of
subsistence and cash crops to offset current reliance on grocery stores.18 In
this way, relocation is seen as an opportunity not only for enhancing
community safety, but also as a way to bolster cultural cohesion and
economic stability for the Tribe.
Several community members are resistant to the idea of relocating, even
as plans move forward. The first sight off Island Road, which connects Isle
de Jean Charles to the nearby community of Pointe-aux-Chenes, is a
handwritten sign declaring “WE ARE NEVER MOVING OFF THIS
12. Jacob Batte, Tensions Arise Between Local Indian Tribes over Effort to Abandon
Sinking Island, HOUMA TODAY (May 11, 2016), http://www.houmatoday.com/article/
DA/20160511/News/608085968/HC.
13. Katz, supra note 7.
14. Bienvenue, Aiokpanchi, Welcome to Isle de Jean Charles, supra note 10.
15. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (describing “federally
recognized tribes” as a political, rather than a racial classification); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555
U.S. 379, 380 (2009) (holding that the Secretary of the Interior is statutorily authorized to
take lands into trust only for tribes that were federally recognized in 1934, at the time the
Indian Reorganization Act was passed).
16. The Vision, ISLE DE JEAN CHARLES: RESETTLEMENT AND SURVIVAL,
http://www.coastalresettlement.org/the-vision.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2016); Van Houten,
supra note 11.
17. WORKSHOP REPORT INPUT INTO THE NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, STORIES OF
CHANGE: COASTAL LOUISIANA TRIBAL COMMUNITIES’ EXPERIENCES OF A TRANSFORMING
ENVIRONMENT (2012), https://downloads.globalchange.gov/nca/technical_inputs/Coastal
LouisianaTribalCommunities2012StoriesOfChange.pdf.
18. NDR APPLICATION, supra note 5, at 410; Van Houten, supra note 11.
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ISLAND.” Nevertheless, there is recognition, even among the few
remaining holdouts, that the island will not always remain inhabitable.19
Today, Chief Albert Naquin, who has spearheaded relocation efforts for the
community, estimates that about forty families would initially relocate to
the new site, with more to follow as conditions on the island worsened.20
B. Native Village of Shishmaref, Alaska
Located 4000 miles northwest of Isle de Jean Charles on a barrier island
in the Chukchi Sea, Shishmaref is one of the most populated Native villages
in northwest Alaska and is home to some 600 people. Like many Alaska
Native villages, the founding story of Shishmaref is not well documented.
Inupiaq communities in northwest Alaska were traditionally semi-nomadic,
and local knowledge suggests that Shishmaref became a permanent
settlement due to the construction of a BIA School on the island in the
1920s.21 Flooding and erosion have been a problem for decades and have
become worse as warmer temperatures have caused shore-fast ice to freeze
up later in the season, reducing the village’s natural barrier against storm
surges.22 The island’s erosion problem has gained national recognition,
thanks in part to several harrowing images of houses sliding into the
Chukchi Sea in the aftermath of fall storms.23
The legal status of Shishmaref is defined by the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA). The ANCSA extinguished all Native
land claims,24 granting, instead, fee title in certain lands to for-profit

19. See Chris LeBlanc, Love and Defiance: Few Holdouts Remain on Isle de Jean
Charles, HOUMA TODAY (Mar. 17, 2015) http://www.houmatoday.com/news/20150307/
love-and-defiance-few-holdouts-remain-on-isle-de-jean-charles.
20. Albert Naquin, Chief of the Isle de Jean Charles Band of Biloxi-ChitimachaChoctaw Indians, Presentation at the CEQ Symposium on Climate Displacement, Migration,
and Relocation (Dec. 13, 2016) (on file with author).
21. Interview with Percy Nayokpuk, Shishmaref resident, in Shishmaref, AK (Aug. 21,
2016); see also ELIZABETH MARINO, FIERCE CLIMATE, SACRED GROUND: AN ETHNOGRAPHY
OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN SHISHMAREF, ALASKA 43 (2015).
22. Victoria Herrmann & Eli Keene, A Continual State of Emergency: Climate Change
and Native Lands in Northwest Alaska, ARCTIC INST. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.the
arcticinstitute.org/continual-state-emergency-climate-change-native-lands-northwest-alaska/.
23. See, e.g., Christopher Mele & Daniel Victor, Reeling from Effects of Climate
Change, Alaskan Village Votes to Relocate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/08/20/us/shishmaref-alaska-elocate-vote-climate-change.html.
24. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971)
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629h (2012)).
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regional and village-level Native corporations.25 While the ANCSA
resolved, with some controversy, the issue of land claims in Alaska, the
federal status of Native tribes in the state remained unclear until 1993. That
year, the BIA, for the first time, published a comprehensive list of 226
Alaska Native villages that, in the BIA’s opinion, constituted federally
recognized tribes with “the same governmental status as other federally
acknowledged Indian tribes by virtue of their status as Indian tribes with a
government-to-government relationship with the United States.”26
Shishmaref first voted to relocate in 2002, but the effort stalled when the
necessary financial resources could not be obtained.27 Sensing a renewed
federal commitment to help Alaska Natives following President Barack
Obama’s visit to the state in 2015,28 the village held another vote in August
2016, where the measure to relocate the village narrowly passed. The
village is considering several sites for relocation across the Shishmaref
Inlet, where many residents maintain seasonal campsites.29 Shishmaref is
heavily dependent on subsistence hunting—mainly the hunting of marine
mammals like bearded seal—and the nearby location would allow residents
to continue subsistence activities to the extent they are not otherwise
impeded by environmental changes.30 While there have been volumes of
media reports and even government studies concerning plans for relocating
the village, to date there has been no money allocated to begin moving the
community to a new site. It is estimated that the cost of relocating the

25. 43 U.S.C. § 1613. The settlement under the ANCSA also included provisions for
oil, gas, and mineral revenue sharing with Alaska Native tribes. See id. § 1608.
26. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54364-01 (Oct. 21, 1993), 1993 WL 420646.
27. Merrit Kennedy, Threatened by Rising Seas, Alaska Village Decides to Relocate,
NPR (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/08/18/490519540/
threatened-by-rising-seas-an-alaskan-village-decides-to-relocate.
28. See Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President at the GLACIER
Conference—Anchorage, AK (Aug. 31, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2015/09/01/remarks-president-glacier-conference-anchorage-ak.
29. Lisa Demer, Shishmaref Votes to Relocate from Eroding Barrier Island to
Mainland, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.adn.com/alaskanews/2016/08/18/eroding-village-of-shishmaref-votes-in-favor-of-relocating-to-mainland-akey-step/.
30. Residents report that hunting for bearded seal has become increasingly dangerous as
sea ice does not freeze as solid or for as long as in the past. See MARINO, supra note 21, at
78.
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village to one of the new sites would be around $180 million, for which
there is not currently a designated federal funding source.31
C. Village of Taholah, Quinault Indian Reservation, Washington
The village of Taholah sits at the mouth of the Quinault river, about 100
miles west of Seattle, on the Quinault Indian Reservation. The village has
always been vulnerable to tsunamis, but coastal flooding, mudslides, and
erosion have become problematic in recent years.32 In 2014, the sea wall
that protects the village was breached in a storm, destroying several
buildings and leading the tribe to "declare[] a state of emergency." 33
Unlike the other communities explored in this part, Taholah is located on
reservation land. The Quinault, therefore, have access to a range of benefits
specifically for federally recognized tribes. At the same time, they also face
the numerous difficulties connected to the United States’ colonial history.
The Quinault Reservation was completely allotted after the passage of the
Dawes Act of 1887, leaving the Quinault Nation with no tribal land by
1933.34 Relocation will mean acquiring allotted land and requesting that the
Department of the Interior place that land into trust. In order to do this, the
tribe plans to use resources from the $1.9 billion Trust Land Consolidation
Fund created by the 2010 settlement of the Cobell class action lawsuit
concerning incorrect accounting of Indian trust assets by the U.S.
government.35 There is little question that the U.S. government has treaty
obligations to the tribe under the Quinault River Treaty of 1855, as well as
the general Indian trust responsibility owed to federally recognized tribes.
In 2015, Fawn Sharp, President of the Quinault Nation, pressed both of
these duties, testifying before Congress that the federal government had

31. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, SHISHMAREF PARTNERSHIP: SHISHMAREF RELOCATION
COLLOCATION STUDY app. 1, at 7 (2004), https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Por
tals/4/pub/USACE_relocation%20plan_shishmaref.pdf [hereinafter SHISHMAREF RELOCATION
AND COLLOCATION STUDY].
32. Eliza Hotchkiss, DOE Assists Quinault Indian Nation with Plans for a ClimateResilient Community, U.S. DEP’T. ENERGY (June 15, 2016), http://energy.gov/indianenergy/
articles/doe-assists-quinault-indian-nation-plans-climate-resilient-community.
33. Quinault Nation Declares State of Emergency After Taholah Seawall Breach,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Mar. 26, 2014), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/
environment/quinault-nation-declares-state-of-emergency-after-taholah-seawall-breach/.
34. Justine E. James, Jr. with Leilani A. Chubby, Quinault, in OLYMPIC PENINSULA
INTERTRIBAL CULTURAL ADVISORY COMM., NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE OLYMPIC PENINSULA 99,
109 (Jacilee Wray ed., 2002).
35. See Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-291, 124 Stat 3064.
AND
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“failed to meet its solemn obligations,” and lobbied for several million
dollars in relocation support.36
The tribe estimates that relocating the 700-person village of Taholah will
cost about $60 million, or $85,000 per resident.37 The relatively low cost
per person is, in part, explained by the availability of immediately adjacent
land—what is currently known as Upper Village—situated at 120 feet
above sea level.38 The nearby site also provides continuity for commercial,
subsistence, and ceremonial salmon fishing and seafood harvesting
practices that are central to the tribe’s culture and economy. 39 While no
federal funds have yet been appropriated for the relocation, the tribe
completed a master plan in 2016 with the aid of a “$700,000 grant from the
Administration for Native Americans.”40
II. Options for Assisting Coastal Retreat
Academics and policymakers working on issues of community
adaptation to climate change have settled around three general alternatives
for coastal retreat planning for imminently threatened communities. When
it comes to Indian and Alaska Native communities, by far the most
attention has been given to the process of community relocation—moving
an entire community to safer ground. Community relocation has often been
presented in contrast to “collocation,” wherein an entire community is
moved together into another existing community.41 The question of what
36. Fawn Sharp, President of Quinault Indian Nation, Quinault Indian Nation
Appropriations Testimony: House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP06/20150324/102898/HHRG-114-AP06-WstateSharpF-20150324.pdf [hereinafter Fawn Sharp Testimony].
37. Ashley Ahearn, Facing Rising Waters, a Native Tribe Takes Its Plea to Paris
Climate Talks, NPR (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/12/01/455745765/facingrising-waters-a-native-tribe-takes-its-plea-to-paris-climate-talks.
38. Taholah Village Relocation Master Plan, QUINAULT INDIAN NATION,
http://www.quinaultindiannation.com/planning/projectinfo.html (last modified May 16,
2017).
39. See Meet Native America: Fawn Sharp, President of the Quinault Indian Nation,
President of the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians and Area Vice President of the National
Congress of American Indians, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. INDIAN (Feb. 22, 2016)
http://blog.nmai.si.edu/main/2016/02/meet-native-america-fawn-sharp.html; James & Chubby,
supra note 34, at 105.
40. Fawn Sharp Testimony, supra note 36.
41. The term “collocation” appears to have arisen specifically with reference to Alaska
Native communities threatened by climate change. The term is used in order to distinguish
relocation—i.e., the moving of a community to a previously unsettled site—from the act of
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happens should neither of these responses materialize has received less
attention in the context of Indian communities. This “do nothing” option
places the question of coastal retreat into the hands of individual
community members and disaster response protocols, both of which are
likely to result in the dispersal of the community.
A. Community Relocation
What are the benefits of moving a community together to a new,
previously unoccupied space? These benefits are not easily quantifiable into
academic research. Nevertheless, hints may be drawn from two sources:
statements from members of affected communities and the robust available
literature on development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR),
which examines outcomes in communities displaced by large infrastructure
projects. The latter of these sources has identified a set of eight risks42 faced
by displaced communities: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness,
decreased access to common resources, marginalization, increased
morbidity, food insecurity, and negative social and cultural impacts. Some
of these risks directly reflect problems posed by collocation or community
dispersion. Resettlement in any form has been suggested to have physical,
economic, psychological, legal, cultural, environmental, and other effects,
and the factors discussed below are by no means an exhaustive list of the
risks populations face in relocating.43
The negative cultural impacts identified in DIDR literature have been
summarized as taking the form of “social disarticulation.”44 Social
disarticulation refers to the breakdown of formal and informal support
networks in a community, which can have lasting negative impacts on
economic status and general well-being.45 The concern about the loss of
these social ties is reflected in a number of forms within climate-threatened
communities. In Shishmaref, for example, residents have expressed concern
that collocating to Nome would cause the “village family” to collapse into
nuclear families. This would mean concerns like childcare and care for the
expanding an existing community to accommodate those displaced from another location.
See, e.g., SHISHMAREF RELOCATION AND COLLOCATION STUDY, supra note 31.
42. See, e.g., A. de Sherbinin et al., Preparing for Resettlement Associated with Climate
Change, 334 SCI. 456 (2011); Michael M. Cernea, Understanding and Preventing
Impoverishment from Displacement: Reflections on the State of Knowledge, 8 J. REFUGEE
STUD. 245 (1995).
43. See ELENA CORREA ET AL., POPULATIONS AT RISK OF DISASTER: A RESETTLEMENT
GUIDE 55 (2011).
44. Cernea, supra note 42, at 252.
45. SCOTT LECKIE, LAND SOLUTIONS FOR CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT 67 (2014).
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elderly would cease to be a village concern and fall on individual parents or
state facilities.46 The maintenance of social bonds was also cited by the Isle
de Jean Charles community as a primary reason that relocation should be
tackled on the community level, as opposed to at the level of individual
residents.47
Similarly, community relocation may help address the risks of loss of
common resources and food insecurity in certain communities. The most
obvious factor in mitigating this risk is that communities can be relocated to
an area that is near traditional lands—including hunting and fishing
grounds—but out of the hazard zone. Indeed, communities like
Shishmaref,48 Taholah,49 and Isle de Jean Charles50 have all sought to
resettle on land that was either contiguous or otherwise easily accessible to
the original settlement, seeking to preserve access to traditional livelihoods
and cultural heritage.
These risks may be further allayed by community relocation in
communities that maintain traditions of food sharing and group hunting. It
is common practice in Inupiaq communities, for example, to share
subsistence foods throughout the community, particularly with elders.51
Food security may therefore be threatened not only by the difficulty of
continuing subsistence hunting in the new location, but by the breakdown in
food sharing traditions as well.
But while there are definite benefits to community relocation over the
collocation and do-nothing variants, there are also major obstacles to
successfully relocating a community. The first, and most serious, of these
obstacles is that community relocation is expensive. The cost problem is
particularly acute in Alaska, where isolation and a short building season
drive up the cost of construction. Relocation costs for the Native village of
Kivalina, with a population of under 400, are projected to go as high as
46. PETER P. SCHWEITZER & ELIZABETH MARINO, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS,
COASTAL EROSION PROTECTION AND COMMUNITY RELOCATION: SHISHMAREF, ALASKA,
COLLOCATION AND CULTURAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 105-06 (David Broadfoot ed., 2005).
47. NDR APPLICATION, supra note 5, at 104.
48. Davis Hovey, Shishmaref Community Votes to Relocate, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Aug.
18, 2016), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2016/08/18/shishmaref-community-votes-to-relocate/.
49. Taholah Village Relocation Master Plan Project: Neighborhoods, QUINAULT
INDIAN NATION, http://www.quinaultindiannation.com/planning/neighborhoods.html (last
modified Sept. 7, 2016).
50. NDR APPLICATION, supra note 5, at 107.
51. SHISHMAREF RELOCATION AND COLLOCATION STUDY, supra note 31, at 109; GARY
KOFINAS ET AL., SUBSISTENCE SHARING NETWORKS AND COOPERATION: KAKTOVIK,
WAINWRIGHT, AND VENETIE, ALASKA 51 (2016).
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$400 million. While the costs are not quite as high in the Lower 48, the
process of conducting site studies, acquiring land, building up infrastructure
from scratch, moving populations, and tearing down the old site is not
cheap. The Isle de Jean Charles resettlement has been allocated $48 million
to accommodate an initial population of around sixty people—about
$800,000 per resident.52 At this point in time, the State of Louisiana is
uncertain that the $48 million will be sufficient to cover all costs.53
Relocation is further complicated by the fact that no single federal or
state agency has authority to coordinate and implement the relocation of
communities.54 This lack of authority has been thoroughly explored by Dr.
Robin Bronen in the context of Alaska. Bronen has identified several
impacts of this lack of authority, including the lack of any guiding
principles on assisting communities in the relocation process.55 Planning
and guidelines are important because a badly managed relocation may raise
the likelihood that community members will not stay at the new site or that
the community may experience cultural or economic loss that the relocation
was meant to avoid.56
This problem further complicates funding. Today, communities must
either seek non-relocation-specific block grants (as in the case of Isle de
Jean Charles) or piece together multiple grants from a variety of agencies
(as in the case of the Native village of Newtok in Alaska). The latter option
raises additional problems in that, under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), any proposal for a major federal action “significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment” requires that agency
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a less-intensive
52. Coral Davenport & Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American Climate
Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettlingthe-first-american-climate-refugees.html.
53. Jacob Batte, Questions Linger over Cost of Moving Island Residents, HOUMA
TODAY (Mar. 26, 2016), http://www.coastalresettlement.org/uploads/7/2/9/7/72979713/
questions_linger_over_cost_of_moving_island_residents_-_houma_today_.pdf.
54. Bronen, supra note 3.
55. Id. at 397.
56. Residents of Shishmaref interviewed by the author in August 2016 often cited
concerns that residents would either refuse to leave the island, specifically noting that their
ancestors graves were located there, or that they would individually move to Nome or
Kotzebue instead of the new site. See also Ted Jackson, Stay or Go? Isle de Jean Charles
Families Wrestle with the Sea, NOLA.COM (Sept. 13, 2016, 10:24 AM), http://www.
nola.com/weather/index.ssf/2016/09/stay_or_go_isle_de_jean_charles_families_wrestle_wit
h_the_sea.html (documenting Isle de Jean Charles residents’ decisionmaking process to stay
on the island or relocate).
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Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).57 With no lead agency in charge
of a single, unified relocation project, piecing together relocation grant
funding from multiple agencies would require producing an individual EIS
or EIA for each agency involved. Given that a typical EIS ranges in cost
from $250,000 to $2 million, this approach ultimately raises the cost of
relocation efforts even further.58
B. Collocation
The option of collocating displaced communities into nearby existing
communities has largely been discussed in Alaska. The major advantage of
collocation over community relocation is cost. Whereas relocation requires
the acquisition of land, the building of access roads for construction, and
the building up of infrastructure from nothing, collocation is, on its face,
merely a matter of expanding existing housing stock and support
infrastructure. Thus, a 2004 Army Corps of Engineers study projected that
relocating Shishmaref to the mainland would cost approximately $179
million, whereas collocating the community with Nome or Kotzebue would
cost $93 million or $140 million, respectively.59
Collocation has a number of anticipated downsides and has thus been
squarely rejected as a viable alternative both by communities considering
it60 and by the Army Corps of Engineers.61 In considering options for
saving the Native village of Newtok, the Army Corps of Engineers
concluded, “Collocation would destroy the Newtok community identity,”
and noted that the lack of support for collocation would lead many in the
community to consider it “forced.”62 This conclusion is largely based on
past experience. The recent history of resettling Indians and Alaska Natives,
as detailed in Part III, exhibited disastrous social and economic effects on
collocated communities.

57. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012); 40
C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2016).
58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-370, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 13 (2014).
59. SHISHMAREF RELOCATION AND COLLOCATION STUDY, supra note 31, at app. 1.
60. Id. at 146 (citing “strong opposition” among Shishmaref residents to the idea of
collocating with Nome or Kotzebue).
61. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, SECTION 117 PROJECT FACT SHEET: STORM DAMAGE
REDUCTION PROJECT—NEWTOK 16 (2008), https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/
Portals/4/pub/Mertarvik_Relocation_Report_final.pdf [hereinafter SECTION 117 PROJECT
FACT SHEET].
62. Id.
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C. Do-Nothing Approach
The final approach is for the federal and state governments to do nothing
to preserve tribal community in managing coastal retreat. As presented
here, the “do nothing” approach does not necessarily mean a complete lack
of federal action. Instead there are two basic approaches, both of which will
lead to community dispersal. First, the federal government (for tribal lands)
or state governments (for land not subject to federal tribal land restrictions)
could orchestrate a buyout of vulnerable properties. The approach of paying
pre-disaster fair market value for property has been used by states to
disperse non-Indian communities living in environmental hazard zones.63 It
should be noted, however, that land value in climate-threatened Indian and
Alaska Native communities is often quite low, and a buyout program is
unlikely to provide the assistance needed to relocate elsewhere.
The second approach is to do nothing until a natural disaster occurs. In
this case, a set of state and federal disaster relief laws and protocols will be
used to evacuate the affected community. The role of disaster law in
climate change adaptation has already garnered some attention from
scholars and policymakers.64 However, the punting of climate-induced
relocation to disaster management protocols does not necessarily have to be
an affirmative choice made by policymakers. While climate change itself
has been described as a “slow-moving disaster,” its individual effects, such
as major flooding and erosion events, are fast-onset.65 Unless a community
is able to design, fund, and implement a relocation plan before a sufficiently
serious flooding or erosion event occurs, disaster response is the default
solution.
There is no coherent body of “disaster law” in the United States. As a
matter of federalism, emergency response to national disasters is left to
state, local, and tribal governments. As a practical matter, however, the
federal government has come to play the dominant role in funding and
implementing disaster response.66 Federal assistance to state, local, and
tribal governments is governed by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
63. See, e.g., ROBERT FREUDENBERG ET AL., BUY-IN FOR BUYOUTS: THE CASE FOR
MANAGED RETREAT FROM FLOOD ZONES (2016) (describing the design of buyout and
acquisition programs in New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey in the aftermath of
Hurricane Sandy).
64. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, Domestic Disaster Preparedness and Response, in THE
LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 481 (Michael
Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012).
65. Id. at 481.
66. Flatt, supra note 64, at 482.
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and Emergency Response Act of 1988.67 Disaster management is
coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
which since 2003 has been a part of the Department of Homeland
Security.68
For purposes of this discussion, the first action likely to be undertaken
during a severe flooding event is an emergency evacuation. The decision to
declare an evacuation in the case of emergency rests with state, tribal, and
local governments. FEMA provides federal support in evacuating residents
to the extent that state or tribal resources are overwhelmed. 69 Many of these
communities have already experienced temporary evacuations. In 2007,
residents of Kivalina were forced to escape fall storms by bush planes, allterrain vehicles and boats. In Louisiana, many coastal communities, have
been subject to repeated evacuation orders by parish governments in the
face of severe storms and associated flooding.70
Evacuations are, in theory, temporary—but what happens after an
evacuation is relevant to the community relocation, particularly where
uncertainty exists as to the inhabitability of the evacuated community. For
disasters that rise to the level of requiring federal assistance, the Stafford
Act provides for both immediate life-saving measures and shelter assistance
as well as temporary federal housing assistance.71 This assistance, in the
form of rent or hotel cost aid or direct assistance (temporary housing
trailers), can be provided for up to eighteen months, or longer if extended
by the president.72
In practice, disasters tend to drive people into external support networks,
such as family members, before federal housing support is mobilized.73 In
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208 (2012).
68. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FEMA B-653, FEMA: PREPARED. RESPONSIVE.
COMMITTED. (2008), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/brochure.pdf.
69. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, MASS EVACUATION INCIDENT ANNEX TO THE
NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 2 (2008), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_
massevacuationincidentannex.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Jason Saul, Lafourche Parish Declares State of Emergency, Issues Partial
Mandatory Evacuation Order, NEW ORLEANS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 4, 2013), http://wwno.org/
post/lafourche-parish-declares-state-emergency-issues-partial-mandatory-evacuation-order;
Louisiana's Terrebonne Parish Braces for Gustav, NPR (Aug. 29, 2008, 4:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94118805.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170(b), 5174 (2012).
72. Id.
73. Elizabeth Fussell, Help from Family, Friends, and Strangers During Hurricane
Katrina: Finding the Limits of Social Networks, in DISPLACED: LIFE IN THE KATRINA
DIASPORA 150 (Lynn Weber & Lori A. Peek ed., 2012).
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the month after Hurricane Katrina, for example, requests for Stafford Act
assistance came from all fifty states.74 After a year, just over fifty percent of
the population of New Orleans had returned to the city.75 Perhaps more
importantly for this discussion, studies demonstrated a significant amount
of intra-parish displacement, suggesting that communities were likely being
fragmented, even where net population figures at the parish level did not
reflect significant changes.76 Thus, disaster-induced evacuations have the
capacity to induce long-term fracturing of communities.
When a disaster leaves no community to return to, it is unlikely that
communities would find themselves long-term relocated together. Climatethreatened Indian communities, therefore, have a marked interest in
avoiding a disaster management approach to managing climate threats.
Disaster management response protocols are poorly equipped to handle the
concerns of a community as a group.
III. A Modern History of Indian Relocation
As discussed above, there are several clear advantages to community
relocation over other approaches to coastal retreat. But, as also
demonstrated, the obstacles of obtaining funding and support for relocation
are large. It is important to recognize that merely concluding that
community relocation is the best response for Indian communities does not
resolve the problem. A community that faces catastrophic disaster before it
is able to plan, fund, and implement a relocation will find itself managed by
disaster protocols. In cases where collocation is significantly cheaper,
communities may find themselves only able to obtain resources to integrate
into existing communities.
It is therefore essential to look more closely at the consequences of
dispersing communities into cities or other small settlements. This may
prove easier in the case of American Indian communities than for any
others. The history of American Indians is, in many senses a history of
relocation. Beginning with the Indian Removal Acts of the 1800s, the
United States has had a long and unenviable record of moving or providing

74. Joe Want & Erin Algner, From the Graphics Archive: Mapping Katrina and Its
Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/08/25/
us/mapping-katrina-and-aftermath.html?_r=0.
75. Narayan Sastry & Jesse Gregory, The Location of Displaced New Orleans Residents
in the Year After Hurricane Katrina, 51 DEMOGRAPHY 753 (2014).
76. Makiko Hori et al., Displacement Dynamics in Southern Louisiana After Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, 28 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y. REV. 45, 58 (2009).
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for the movement of Indian populations. Each of these relocation policies
comes with its own lessons.
This part contextualizes the options for coastal retreat planning by
looking back to this history of relocation. In the interest of drawing upon
relatively reliable data and equivalent circumstances, it draws upon two
twentieth century case studies from the Termination Era. This Part begins
by examining the historical significance of Termination as a federal Indian
policy. Next, it explores two examples of Indian policy during the era: the
BIA Urban Indian Relocation Program of the 1950s and the relocation of
the Alaska Native population of King Island to Nome in the 1960s. Finally,
this part presents several qualifications to these case studies and draws
lessons for future coastal retreat planning.
A. The Termination Era
In 1953, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted Concurrent
Resolution 108, which declared that it was “the policy of Congress, as
rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the
United States subject to the same laws . . . as are applicable to other citizens
of the United States, [and] to end their status as wards of the United
States.”77 The House Resolution marked a transition in federal policy—
from the previous approach of a proactive BIA to a policy of removing any
special treatment or disability for Indian tribes. While the Resolution is
synonymous today with the Termination Era, the roots of this shift in
federal policy date back to the mid-1940s.78
In 1928, the U.S. Senate commissioned a fifteen-year, forty-one-part
survey on the living conditions of American Indians. At the survey’s
conclusion in 1943, Congress accused the BIA of straying from the its
original purpose, noting, “While the original aim [of the Bureau] was to
make the Indian a citizen, the present aim appears to be to keep the Indian
an Indian and to make him satisfied with all the limitations of a primitive
life.”79 Therein lay the foundation for the termination policy. Over the next
two decades, the federal government would terminate 109 tribes, remove

77. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong. (1953).
78. Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 145 (1977).
79. S. REP. NO. 78-310, at 1 (1943).
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2.5 million acres of Indian land from trust, and repeatedly enhance state
jurisdiction over tribes.80
While debates have raged surrounding the intent of the termination
policy, which was denounced by President Richard Nixon in 1970, the
conditions on Indian reservations in the mid-1940s were undeniably bleak.
In 1948 and 1949, Indians in Navajo country were brought to the brink of
starvation by a series of blizzards that exacerbated conditions of poverty.81
The poverty of the Navajo and Hopi was severe enough to garner national
media attention.82 In response, Congress passed the Navajo-Hopi Long
Range Rehabilitation Act of 1950, designating over $88 million for career
training, social services, and the economic development of the
reservations.83 The Rehabilitation Act’s emphasis on job placement and
creation of a Navajo off-reservation employment service would lay the
baseline for a broader Indian relocation policy to come.
B. The Urban Indian Relocation Program
The policy that has come to be known as the Urban Indian Relocation
Program was never really a coherent program unto itself. Instead, it
developed gradually throughout the 1950s, growing out of the
government’s experience with the Navajo and Hopi. By the middle of 1951,
the BIA had used its experience in Navajo country to expand relocation
services to new states like California, Colorado, and Oklahoma.84 The
Bureau opened up field offices across the country to help place Indians into
employment opportunities in major urban centers, beginning with
Chicago.85 In 1952, the BIA began to provide meager financial assistance to
some relocatees, covering one-way transportation to their urban destination
and a few weeks of transition assistance.86

80. History and Culture: Termination Policy 1953-1968, PARTNERSHIP WITH NATIVE
AM. (last visited Dec. 26, 2016), http://www.nativepartnership.org/site/PageServer?page
name=PWNA_Native_History_terminationpolicyNP.
81. PAUL ROSIER, SERVING THEIR COUNTRY: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND
PATRIOTISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 124 (2009).
82. Id.
83. Ch. 92, 64 Stat. 44 (1950) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 631–640 (2012)).
84. Azusa Ono, The Relocation and Employment Assistance Programs, 1948-1970:
Federal Indian Policy and the Early Development of the Denver Indian Community, 5
INDIGENOUS NATIONS J. 27, 33 (2004).
85. Id.; DONALD L. FIXICO, THE URBAN INDIAN EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 10 (2000).
86. Ono, supra note 85, at 34.
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The program grew slowly at first. By July 1956, the BIA had relocated
12,625 Indians from reservations to cities.87 But in 1956, Congress provided
for a massive shift in relocation efforts by passing Public Law 959, the
Indian Vocational Training Act, which injected $3.5 million a year into
relocation efforts.88 As the Act’s name might suggest, the Bureau would
place renewed focus on job training, and was authorized to provide up to
two years of free vocational training to reservation Indians.89 As the
emphasis on job skills development became integrated into broader
relocation efforts, BIA officials negotiated directly with urban employers to
hire Indian workers.90 By some counts, these efforts aided some 160,000
rural Indians in relocating to urban areas between 1952 and 1967.91
The focus of the relocation program was on providing a basic level of
transition assistance. BIA employees in Indian Country coordinated with
urban field offices to place applicants into fitting employment in the city of
their choosing.92 The financial assistance provided to a relocatee was
generally minimal, consisting of a bus ticket, first month’s rent, clothing,
and one month of groceries and other essentials.93 Relocatees had ongoing
access to job counseling.94 The relocation program was heavily marketed on
reservations, with one BIA brochure, in seeming homage to socialist
realism, picturing smiling Indians operating heavy machinery and studying
at a school desk with the promise of “good jobs” and “happy homes.”95
Little consensus has emerged on the outcomes of the BIA’s urban
relocation efforts, a fact due in part to the BIA’s shoddy record keeping on

87. FIXICO, supra note 86, at 16.
88. Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 930, 70 Stat. 986 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 309
(2012)).
89. Id.
90. FIXICO, supra note 86, at 17.
91. ALFRED G. ELGIN ET AL., TASK FORCE EIGHT FINAL REPORT: REPORT ON URBAN AND
RURAL NON-RESERVATION INDIANS 23 (1976). It should be noted that statistics on the
program are wildly inconsistent. Other sources have reported the total number of relocates as
around 61,000. See, e.g., Ono, supra note 85, at 44. The BIA’s inaccurate and sometimes
willfully distorted recordkeeping on Indian relocation during the Termination Era has made
analysis of the ultimate effects of the relocation program contentious.
92. FIXICO, supra note 86, at 11.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 19.
95. See Come to Denver: The Chance of a Lifetime! (n.d.) (promotional image from
BIA brochure), https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nativevoices/assets/timeline/000/000/074/74_w_
full.jpg (last visited Dec. 26, 2016).
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relocatees.96 A wave of recent scholarship has underlined the importance of
these policies in shaping modern Indian demographics, as over two-thirds
of the country’s total Indian population now lives in urban areas.97 These
scholars have viewed the voluntary urbanization process as an important
first step in escaping the crushing poverty of many reservations and the
overbearing paternalism of the BIA.98 The BIA itself declared the program
a success, asserting (rather dubiously) that only thirty percent of relocatees
returned home within a year of relocation.99
But most evaluations of the BIA’s urban relocation policy were not so
forgiving. In early 1975, Congress passed a joint resolution establishing the
American Indian Policy Review Commission, consisting of nine task forces
established to review specific areas of federal Indian policy.100 The next
year, the Commission’s Task Force Eight delivered its Report on Urban
and Rural Non-Reservation Indians.101 The Report gave a damning account
of the struggles of relocatees in adapting to their new urban environments.
In sum, Task Force Eight found that:
Indian people in substantial numbers came to urban areas
because of a lack of employment . . . but have failed to make a
desirable transition because of a lack of necessary and sufficient,
continued support from the Federal Government, coupled with
the indifference and misunderstandings, by and large, existing in
the communities in which they have chosen to live.102
In particular, the comprehensive review of the Urban Indian Relocation
Program presented by Task Force Eight repeatedly identified three
problems newcomers encountered in cities: substandard living conditions,
unstable employment, and cultural isolation. The confluence of
underfunded accommodations and rampant housing discrimination quickly
led to the creation of “Indian ghettoes.”103 The report noted that relocatees
were often placed into squalid conditions, sometimes with an entire family
96. Ono, supra note 85, at 39 (“Universal statistical data had never been available,
primarily because of inadequate records and reports prepared by the BIA.”).
97. Donald L. Fixico, Foreword to AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE URBAN EXPERIENCE at
ix (Susan Lobo & Kurt Peters eds., 2001) [hereinafter Fixico, Foreword].
98. Kenneth R. Philp, Stride Toward Freedom: The Relocation of Indians to Cities,
1952-1960, 16 W. HIST. Q. 175, 177 (1985).
99. FIXICO, supra note 86, at 20.
100. S.J. Res. 133, 93rd Cong. (1973) (enacted).
101. ELGIN ET AL., supra note 92.
102. Id. at 2.
103. FIXICO, supra note 86, at 81; see also ELGIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 34.
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occupying a one-room apartment.104 The shortage of adequate, affordable
housing was compounded by the fact that most Indians did not qualify for
public housing assistance in their new cities.105 In Denver, for example, the
municipal housing authority placed a six-month residency requirement on
applicants for public housing, leaving new arrivals with few places to turn
other than slums.106
The employment arranged for the relocatees did little to alleviate these
conditions. The vocational training arranged by the BIA failed to open up
opportunities for advancement—with reported hourly wages for training
participants hovering at $2.40 an hour, even lower than the $2.59 an hour
received by Indians who were placed directly into jobs without training.107
Low on the employment ladder, Indians would often be let go during
financial downturns, and the BIA did not have adequate funding to support
laid off workers in these circumstances.108 Furthermore, many relocatees
lost any opportunity they may have had to pursue higher education. College
education was not built into the relocation program and the scholarships
that were generally available to Indians were not made available to those
living off-reservation.109
The conditions of the urban relocatees produced widespread feelings of
social and cultural isolation. It is difficult to pin down a specific cause of
this isolation, though scholars and policy reports have identified slum-like
living conditions,110 culture shock,111 racial segregation,112 and lack of
community space to hold cultural activities113 as contributing factors.
Isolation was seen as a major contributing cause of alcoholism among
urban Indians.114 Problems with alcohol, and resultant problems with the
law, often caused relocatees and their families to return home.115
While the Urban Indian Relocation Program did create some long-term
positive effects, including aiding the growth of stable urban Indian
104. ELGIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 34.
105. Id.
106. Ono, supra note 85, at 42.
107. ELGIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 36-37.
108. Id. at 38.
109. Id. at 37.
110. Fixico, Foreword, supra note 98, at ix.
111. FIXICO, supra note 86, at 14.
112. Id. at 24.
113. ELGIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 75.
114. Id.; FIXICO, supra note 86, at 24.
115. JAMES B. LAGRAND, INDIAN METROPOLIS: NATIVE AMERICANS IN CHICAGO 1945-75,
at 133 (2002).
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populations, when viewed in the context of its aims, the program was a
failure. The program did not result in the rapid assimilation of Indians into
the general population of U.S. cities. Nor did it raise the general standard of
living for Indians, who largely failed to find the comfortable middle class
lifestyle that had been marketed to them. Relocatees instead often found
themselves in unfamiliar cities, thousands of miles from home with
insecure jobs and no emergency government assistance available.116 Critics
of the program (who were themselves accused of manipulating statistics)
claimed that as many as seventy-five percent of relocatees returned home
within the first year.117
C. The Resettlement of King Island
In 1930, the BIA completed construction of the first ever day school on
King Island.118 The island—a mile-wide dot of steep rock cliffs in the
Bering Sea, thirty miles off the coast of mainland Alaska—was at one point
home to some 200 residents. The King Islanders were Inupiat subsistence
hunters: harvesting walruses, seals, and polar bears as ice conditions
permitted. Residents called the tiny rock island home for most of the year,
traveling to a makeshift village outside of Nome only in the summers in
order to sell ivory carvings, buy goods, and see friends and relatives living
on the mainland.119
In 1959, this semi-nomadic existence came to an abrupt end when the
BIA announced the closure of the King Island school. The result was,
effectively, the closure of King Island. That year only sixty-four residents
returned to the island after summer’s end, and by 1966 the island had been
abandoned.120
The experience of King Island is perhaps the best example in recent U.S.
history of collocation. But tragically little has been written about it. Indeed,
there is only one complete account of the history of the King Islanders’
move to Nome—a 2004 master’s thesis by Nicole Braem, then a student at
the University of Alaska Fairbanks.121 Despite the limited scholarly study,
116. FIXICO, supra note 86, at 77.
117. Id. at 20.
118. Nicole M. Braem, Leaving King Island: The Closure of a Bureau of Indian Affairs
School and Its Consequences 38 (Aug. 2004) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Alaska
Fairbanks) (available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global (305207068)).
119. Id. at 4.
120. Deanna Kingston & Elizabeth Marino, Twice Removed: King islanders’ Experience
of ‘Community’ Through Two Relocations, 69 HUMAN ORG. 119, 122 (2010).
121. Braem, supra note 119.
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the experience of King Islanders served as the baseline for both government
agencies and affected Alaska Native communities in rejecting the
collocation alternative.
While analyzing the impact of the King Islanders’ collocation to Nome is
made difficult by the lack of data and contemporary reporting, existing
sources help highlight two conclusions. First, the King Islanders faced
many of the same issues as urban Indian relocatees, largely brought about
by lack of resources to aid the transition. And second—a unique lesson
from the King Island case—is that once a community has collocated it can
be extremely difficult to build up the political will to move that community
to a new site.
Following the BIA school closing, the King Islanders faced a severe
housing crisis in Nome. The small village that had been built for Nome’s
short summers was ill equipped to handle the harsh Alaskan winters, and
houses were unequipped with electricity or running water.122 Discrimination
blossomed as a result of this collocation. King Island children were
harassed in schools and the slur “K.I.” came into use as a derogatory term
referring to the newcomers.123 Alcohol never made inroads onto King
Island, where strong social mores and tough environmental conditions left
little room for drinking.124 These barriers broke down in Nome. Poverty,
discrimination, and a plethora of bars allowed alcoholism to grab hold of
many in the community.125
Perhaps the most dramatic aspect, however, was the economy. Most
available jobs in Nome at the time were seasonal—in mining or
construction—and even those sectors were struggling.126 But while lowpaying jobs had been a problem for the urban Indians in the Lower 48, in
Nome the issue was compounded by the loss of subsistence. In the past,
King Islanders would earn enough money selling ivory carvings in Nome
over the summer to buy basic provisions, obtaining the rest of their diet
through the subsistence hunting of seals, polar bears, and walrus.127 But the
sea mammal yield from Nome was minimal, and different sea ice patterns
in Nome meant that hunters would have to travel great distances in harsh

122. Id. at 151.
123. Id. at 156.
124. Id. at 55; Interview with Vince Pikonganna, former King Island resident, in Nome,
AK (Aug. 28, 2016).
125. SHISHMAREF RELOCATION AND COLLOCATION STUDY, supra note 31, at 55.
126. Braem, supra note 119, at 154-55.
127. Id. at 161.
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conditions to harvest these animals.128 The loss was both economic and
cultural. Not only was the community forced to resort to expensive storebought food for sustenance, the community also lost much of its traditional
hunting knowledge in the process.129
Braem’s study of the King Island move underlines a secondary
conclusion—that once the community had established itself in Nome, it was
unlikely to receive assistance in moving elsewhere. Already in 1959, the
King Islanders had begun to lobby for the establishment of a new village
for them at Cape Woolley, a small campsite due east from the Island and
with limited road access to Nome.130 The idea received substantial support
from both the Alaska offices of the BIA and the Alaska state legislature,
which passed a resolution calling on the Secretary of the Interior to assist
with the relocation project.131 Braem’s review of correspondence reflects a
belief among the King Islanders and the Association on American Indian
Affairs that, at least in 1961, the Cape Woolley relocation was a sure
thing.132
But the Cape Woolley plan quickly stagnated. Looming over the project
was the cost to resettle the 150 King Islanders in Nome at the time,
estimated at $750,000.133 By 1962, a variety of forces were already
undermining the move away from Nome. That year the BIA began to raise
questions about whether the community as a whole really desired the
relocation or whether the campaign was the work of individual activists.134
But even after the commissioning of a survey in 1963 demonstrating
overwhelming desire to relocate to Cape Woolley, bureaucratic footdragging between Washington and Alaska meant no progress was made on
resolving questions of obtaining money, building materials and land.135 The
BIA offices in Alaska, meanwhile, had decided that despite the results of
the survey, the King Islanders had decided to delay relocation due to the
potential establishment of an ivory carving workshop in Nome. 136 By 1964,
128. SHISHMAREF RELOCATION AND COLLOCATION STUDY, supra note 31, at 58.
129. Interview with Vince Pikonganna, supra note 125.
130. Braem, supra note 119, at 94.
131. Id. at 98.
132. Id. at 104 (citing Letter from Laverne Madigan, Executive Director, AAIA, to Paul
Tiulana, Anchorage, AK (Dec. 20, 1961) (on file with Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library,
Princeton University)) (“[Acting BIA Commissioner] John Carver told me definitely that
you King Islanders will get your new village.”).
133. Id. at 94.
134. Id. at 111.
135. Id. at 119, 125-26.
136. Id. at 126.
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the BIA turned its attention to the possibility of resettling King Island by
opening an air strip on the island itself, something it ultimately concluded
was cost-prohibitive.137
In the final death knell of the Cape Woolley project, the BIA contracted
with Frances Ross, an academic who had previously lived on King Island,
to produce a study on what would be best for the community. 138 By the time
the Ross study was commissioned, six years had passed since the Cape
Woolley relocation was first proposed, and reports from Nome suggested
that the unanimity of the King Islanders’ desire to relocate had frayed. 139
The BIA awaited Ross’s report, which never came. By 1967, the Bureau
had still not received a draft and, indeed, never succeeded in locating Ms.
Ross again.140
D. Qualifications and Lessons
In seeking to draw lessons from the cases of the Urban Indian Relocation
Program and the King Island resettlement, it is important to start with the
question of what these case studies are not. Most importantly, they are not
direct analogues to the socio-economic condition of Indians and Alaska
Natives today. First, economic conditions among Indians have improved
somewhat. While twenty-seven percent of Indians still live below the
poverty line,141 Indian income per person has grown rapidly since the
1990s, in part due to the advent of gaming in the Lower 48.142
But the change of conditions is not just a matter of income. As recent
scholars of the Urban Indian Relocation Program have noted, more than
two-thirds of American Indians now live in urban areas.143 This stands in
stark contrast to the BIA’s urban relocatees, many of whom had never
before left the reservation.144
The final word of caution in analyzing these case studies is that
background federal Indian policy matters. Both the urban relocation
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 134-43.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 150.
SUZANNE MACARTNEY ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ACSBR/11-17, POVERTY
RATES FOR SELECTED DETAILED RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE AND PLACE: 2007–
2011, at 2 (2013).
142. Joseph P. Kalt et al., The State of the Native Nations Conditions Under U.S. Policies
of Self-Determination 363 (2007), http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic177572.files/
SONN_Final_01_09_07.pdf (draft manuscript).
143. Fixico, Foreword, supra note 98, at ix.
144. ELGIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 35; Philp, supra note 101, at 184.
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program and the King Island relocation played out against a background of
Termination, where the fundamental drive of federal policy was to
assimilate Indians into white American society. The inherently harmful
effects of Termination have led some commentators to suggest that the
urban relocation program was not in and of itself bad for Indians, but that
its execution against a backdrop of cost cutting and cultural destruction
intensified negative outcomes.145 Federal Indian policy today is
dramatically different than it was in the 1950s and 60s. While it remains
possible that this policy might change dramatically following the results of
the 2016 presidential election, at the time of this writing in late 2016, the
federal government has embraced an Indian policy that emphasizes an
increased voice for tribes and respect for tribal sovereignty.146
With these qualifications in mind, there are still several important
lessons to be gleaned from these two mid-century relocations. The most
obvious of these is that moving populations into existing communities can
be extremely problematic for the newcomers. However, many of the
problems that displaced communities do face are discrete issues rooted
primarily in underinvestment in the relocation process.
Investment in the case of collocation or dispersal is needed both to
compensate for existing states of poverty in relocating populations and to
help recipient communities absorb relocatees successfully. In both cases
examined here, relocatees faced dire conditions that reflected
underinvestment in their success in their new community. Slums
proliferated quickly in all recipient communities, a direct result of the
nearly complete lack of housing assistance offered to relocatees by federal,
state, and municipal governments. Low quality housing had cascading
effects on the lives of relocatees, and was repeatedly cited as contributing to
alcoholism and depression.
Similarly, relocating people from economically depressed communities
requires major investment in job training and job creation. The case of King
Island demonstrates the severe poverty that can result when a recipient
community is unable to absorb newcomers into an already stagnant job
market. Even where jobs exist, the urban Indian program demonstrates that
problems might persist for relocatees. Racial discrimination and lack of
adequate job training or education kept urban Indians in the 1950s in lowpaying, insecure jobs. Without investment in vocational training, higher
145. Philp, supra note 101, at 188-90.
146. See Editorial, Candidate Obama Kept His Promise to Native Americans, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/opinion/candidate-obama-kept-hispromise-to-native-americans.html.
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education, job placement and social services counseling, this is likely to
continue to be a problem for relocatees today. The cost of coastal retreat,
should therefore account for more than just physical infrastructure; it also
must account for the various programs needed to assist relocatees transition.
A second takeaway from these case studies is that relocatees consistently
cited a sense of cultural loss or isolation after moving. Preserving culture in
relocation is, perhaps, a more difficult problem than boosting living
conditions, because it cannot be fully resolved through financial support.
For example, little could have been done to preserve traditional subsistence
hunting practices for King Islanders in Nome, given the geographic
distance they had moved. Recognizing that some relocation efforts will
produce irreparable cultural loss is, in itself, an important consideration
when addressing relocation planning.
Nevertheless, even in the 1950s, individual efforts sprung up in urban
centers to provide cultural support to relocatees. During the urban
relocation program, private donors and volunteers helped establish “Indian
centers” in major relocation destinations.147 These centers served not only
as a place to provide economic, social, and legal assistance to urban
Indians, but also as a place for cultural programming and recreation aimed
at reducing the feeling of isolation.148 Such cultural centers can continue to
play a role in protecting against cultural degradation today. Indeed, one
King Island elder in an interview in 2016 cited the lack of adequate space
for cultural programming as contributing to the loss of traditional
knowledge among the King Island population still living in Nome.149
Finally, the King Island example, in particular, demonstrates the
inadequacy of stop-gap fixes. Once the King Islanders were in Nome, a
range of forces conspired to keep them there, and the perception of the
Cape Woolley project turned from a solution, to a problem, to an additional
problem unto itself. The King Island case demonstrates that money is not
likely to become available to people whose immediate needs are perceived
as being met. Further, community consensus regarding relocation may
erode as time drags on, particularly if additional stop-gap measures (like the
ivory workshop in Nome) are floated. Communities that aim for a specific
relocation outcome, therefore, would do well to exercise caution when
accepting any ‘temporary’ fix.
147. ELGIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 41.
148. Id.; NAT’L URBAN INDIAN FAMILY COAL., URBAN INDIAN AMERICA: THE STATUS OF
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN AND FAMILIES TODAY (2012),
http://caseygrants.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/NUIFC_Report2.pdf.
149. Interview with Vince Pikonganna, supra note 125.
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IV. Learning Lessons from the Past
This article is primarily an appeal to pragmatism. As the above case
studies show, community relocation can address a number of the harmful
effects that accompany the displacement of climate-threatened
communities. But community relocation is also expensive, and obtaining
funds to relocate has proven exceedingly difficult. If sufficient funding
cannot be obtained, a variety of factors are likely to push community
members to disperse into existing cities or settlements. Whether the
displaced community moves into existing settlements as a group or as
individuals, the Termination Era case studies underline that displaced
individuals will likely face a number of social and economic problems in
their new homes. In planning for coastal retreat, Indian communities set on
relocation must therefore plan for and pressure federal and state
governments to prepare for what will happen if the community ends up
displaced or dispersed. This will mean seeking support for addressing the
anticipated problems of collocation and dispersal even while continuing to
advocate for wholesale community relocation.
The most obvious of these issues, and the most frequently identified
issue by federal agencies working with climate threatened communities, is
physical infrastructure. In both the case studies discussed in the previous
part, relocatees were confined to substandard housing due, in part, to
underinvestment in expanding adequate housing stock in the recipient
community. In considering alternatives for Shishmaref, the Army Corps of
Engineers factored in the cost of moving houses from Shishmaref to Nome
and constructing new modular homes for residents, as well as building the
support infrastructure to tie these homes to utilities.150 The Army Corps of
Engineers also attempted to identify potential funding for the construction
of these homes, noting that HUD would be a likely vehicle for funding, and
in particular noting that the Native American Housing and Self
Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA) allows Alaska Native villages to
determine how HUD grants will be applied in their communities.151
But the Army Corps of Engineers, in considering the cost of physical
infrastructure, also arrives at misleading conclusions as to the cost of
relocation. The report estimates that collocating Shishmaref with Nome
would come to a total cost of about $93 million, representing a savings of
$86 million over relocating the community to a new site across the

150. SHISHMAREF RELOCATION AND COLLOCATION STUDY, supra note 31, at 47-48.
151. Id. at app. 2.
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Shishmaref lagoon.152 But these savings are inflated, because they do not
account for non-infrastructure investment in the collocated community.
This oversight ignores the lessons of the Termination Era programs.
Participants in the Urban Indian Relocation Program, for example, found
themselves stuck on the bottom rung of the ladder in a competitive job
market for which they were poorly trained. Job training at the time was not
adequate and job counseling even less so. Thus, analyses of costs
surrounding displacing community members to a site, other than a new
village site, should account for the costs of training them to function in the
economy of their destination.
Similarly, there has been little effort to address cultural loss for
potentially displaced Indian communities. Relocation has been repeatedly
touted as the only means of preserving community identity among climatedisplaced tribes,153 with one prominent scholar branding it “the only
immediate and permanent solution to protect people facing climate-induced
ecological change.”154 Thus, the natural conclusion is that the choice for
communities is to either relocate as a community or assimilate.
But the experiences of Indian and Alaska Native communities in the
mid-twentieth century suggest that this conclusion does not tell the whole
story. Indeed, while some aspects of culture were and remain
irreplaceable—such as the traditional subsistence practices of the King
Islanders—other relocatees faced cultural losses that could have been
ameliorated by additional investment. The upcropping of Indian Centers in
American cities and their use to support cultural programming demonstrate
one way in which cultural isolation can be addressed. Aspects of culture
and community can be preserved, as they have been in diaspora
communities around the world, by investment in these types of spaces, to
continue cultural practices as well as educational programs to pass down
traditions to a younger generation. But this type of cultural investment takes
both funding—possibly from federal sources participating in the overall
coastal retreat of affected tribes—and planning by the tribes themselves.
Finally, the experience of the King Island community in Nome
underlines the need to establish set timelines for the relocation or
collocation process. As described in the previous part, King Islanders
lobbied for years for support to move to Cape Woolley, where they could
reestablish their community, only to have the project die a gradual, quiet
152. Id. at app. 1.
153. See SECTION 117 PROJECT FACT SHEET, supra note 61, at 6-8.
154. Bronen, supra note 3, at 360.
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death. This example should be a matter of concern for all Indian and Alaska
Native communities seeking to relocate. Shishmaref first voted to relocate
in 2002, but has not moved past the stage of federal government studies. 155
While the commissioning of studies is an important first step, every year
without additional action pushes a community closer to emergency. If
studies drag on long enough, they can come to delay the taking of action
which might require millions of dollars and several years to implement until
it is too late.
Avoiding the worst consequences of climate-induced displacement will
require action from both tribes and government. This will mean recognizing
that, if current trends continue, many communities that would have elected
to relocate will be displaced before a relocation can be funded and
effectuated. Thus, affected tribes and government agencies supporting them
should plan for how to preserve these communities in the event that they
are forced to disperse.
This is not an easy task. It means devoting focus to a Plan B without
concluding that Plan A has failed. Moreover, as demonstrated by the urban
relocatees of the 1950s, it will mean addressing a wide range of complex
social, cultural and economic problems that can be difficult to anticipate ex
ante. Addressing these issues will take planning and funding. And with
global temperatures continuing to trend upwards, there is little time to lose.
Conclusion
Relocation is deeply intertwined with the history of Indian Country. The
history of the United States is replete with episodes of settling, uprooting,
and resettling Indian tribes—often to areas with no connection to their
homelands. And while government strategies have changed from the forced
migrations under the Indian Removal Acts to voluntary and semi-voluntary
urbanization in the mid-twentieth century, these varied efforts have
nevertheless repeatedly proven disastrous for affected tribes and
individuals.
As global climate change hurries the erosion of U.S. coastlines, we are
on the verge of a new era of Indian relocation. But as of yet, few decisions
have been made about what this era will look like. The failure of the federal
government to delegate either the funds or the authority to coordinate the
155. A 2003 report by the GAO describes Shishmaref as “in imminent danger from
flooding and erosion.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO 04-142, ALASKA NATIVE
VILLAGES: MOST ARE AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT FEW QUALIFY FOR
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 4 (2003), https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/240810.pdf.
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resettlement of climate-displaced tribes means that the country has no
coherent policy on how this relocation will occur. Today, many Indian
communities are left planning to relocate using funds that may never
materialize. As this planning process drags on, possibly for decades in some
communities, it becomes increasingly likely that these communities will
disperse to different locations in the aftermath of a disaster-induced
displacement.
The need for government clarity on a climate-induced relocation policy
has long been established.156 But until funding and authority are delegated
to support relocation efforts, affected Indian communities must attempt to
address the uncertainties of what will happen if they are displaced by a
severe storm or erosion event. Addressing these uncertainties means that
both tribes and government agencies must take a hard look at the history of
Indian relocation. This history demonstrates a series of destructive
outcomes rooted in underinvestment in collocated communities and
individuals as well as consistent discounting of the importance of culture
and traditional practices to Indian community resilience.
The consequences of this underinvestment can, in many cases, be
countered. But this requires planning. It is imperative that communities
electing to relocate focus not only on their Plan A—moving as a
community—but also on a Plan B—how community and cultural bonds can
be maintained if the community is displaced by a disaster. While it is
tempting to conclude that tribal identity will be completely destroyed absent
wholesale community relocation, this ignores the lessons of past
relocations. Indian communities that are forced to disperse will undoubtedly
sustain some irreplaceable cultural losses. However, a pragmatic approach
to addressing Plan B alternatives will allow tribes and government agencies
to work together to alleviate many of the inevitable burdens of
displacement.

156. See id.
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